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We propose a new explanation for the foreign exchange forward-premium and delayed-overshooting puzzles. We
show that both puzzles arise from a systematic distortion in investors￿s beliefs about the interest rate process.
Accordingly, the forward premium is always a biased predictor of future depreciation; the bias can be so severe as to
lead to negative coeﬃcients in the ￿Fama￿ regression. Delayed overshooting may or may not occur depending upon
the persistence of interest rate innovations and the degree of misperception. We document empirically the extent of
this distortion using survey data for G-7 countries against the U.S. and ￿nd that it is strong enough to account for
these irregularities.
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1. Introduction
This paper proposes a new explanation for two important puzzles on foreign exchange behavior: the
forward premium puzzle and the delayed overshooting puzzle. We demonstrate how both puzzles can arise
from a speci￿c distortion in beliefs about future interest rates. We document empirically the extent of this
distortion for the G-7 countries and ￿nd that it is strong enough to explain these irregularities.
Over the past twenty ￿ve years, a substantial body of literature has documented the existence of large
biases in the foreign exchange forward premium.1 This ￿Forward Premium Puzzle￿ (FPP) implies that
nominal interest rate diﬀerentials between two countries bear little predictive power for the future rate of
change in their nominal exchange rate. If anything, a positive f o r w a r dp r e m i u mi so f t e na s s o c i a t e dw i t h
a subsequent appreciation o ft h ee x c h a n g er a t e ,n o tt h edepreciation that theory predicts. This empirical
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regularity implies predictable excess returns on foreign exchange markets.
A lesser known puzzle, the delayed overshooting puzzle, was documented by Eichenbaum and Evans
(1995). These authors ￿nd that unanticipated contractionary shocks to U.S. monetary policy are followed
by a persistent increase in U.S. interest rates and a gradual appreciation of the dollar, followed by a gradual
depreciation several months later. This delayed overshooting pattern is consistent with predictable excess
returns: for a while, U.S. interest rates are higher than foreign rates, yet the dollar appreciates, yielding
positive excess returns. This dynamic pattern is also in contradiction with Dornbusch (1976)￿s overshooting
result, whereby the exchange rate should experience an immediate appreciation, and then depreciate gradu-
ally towards its new long run equilibrium value. While both puzzles are statements about predictable excess
returns, they diﬀer in subtle ways. The former is an unconditional statement about nominal interest rates
and changes in exchange rates. The latter is a statement about their joint conditional response to a common
unanticipated monetary innovation.2
In an accounting sense, there are two possible explanations for predictable excess returns: time-varying
risk premia and/or expectational errors. Fully rational models with time-varying risk premia have had
diﬃculties explaining these puzzles away.3 This paper allows instead for some departure from full-rationality.
Our starting point is a setup where investors constantly try to determine the duration ￿transitory versus
persistent￿ of interest rate shocks. In and by itself, this is not enough to account for the puzzles since
rational agents cannot be systematically fooled. We thus introduce a particular distortion in the investors￿s
beliefs about future interest rates. Speci￿cally, we assume that investors misperceive the relative importance
of transitory and persistent interest rate shocks, as measured by the variance of their innovations. Given
these subjective beliefs, the exchange rate is determined by the standard no-arbitrage condition. In other
words, subjective uncovered interest rate parity holds in our model.
We show that the model can exhibit both delayed overshooting and the forward premium bias if investors
overestimate the importance of transitory shocks relative to persistent shocks, or equivalently, under-react
to interest rate innovations. Moreover, for some parameter values, the forward premium bias can take its
most extreme form, i.e. a negative correlation of the currency forward premium and the depreciation rate.
Our model can also account for the volatility and the persistence puzzles observed in the data. Exchange
rate changes are more variable than predictable excess returns, which in turn are more variable than the
forward premium. Furthermore, exchange rate changes are less persistent than the forward premium.4Exchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 3
We document empirically the importance and direction of these distortions using two sources of interest
rate expectations: monthly 3, 6 and 12 months ahead consensus forecast data on 3-month eurorates published
by the Financial Times Currency Forecaster, and implicit forward rates constructed according to the rational
expectation hypothesis of the term structure. In both cases, we compare the ￿true￿ empirical process for the
interest rate diﬀerential against the 3-month eurodollar, and the ￿subjective￿ process that is consistent with
the observed forecasts. We ￿nd substantial distortions in investors￿s beliefs and strong evidence that investors
overestimate the relative importance of transitory interest rate shocks. Strikingly, given our estimates of
the subjective beliefs, our model is able to replicate the observed forward discount and delayed overshooting
puzzles, as well as the volatility and the persistence puzzles.
To gain some intuition for our result, consider the following experiment. Suppose that U.S. interest rates
increase relative to U.K. interest rates, then return gradually to their equilibrium value. If investors knew the
exact nature of the interest rate shock, arbitrage would force the dollar to appreciate immediately relative to
its long run value, up to the point where its expected future depreciation equals the forward premium. The
dollar would then progressively revert to equilibrium as the forward premium vanishes. This is the forward
premium eﬀect. Suppose now that investors misperceive the U.S. interest rate shock as transitory. On impact,
investors believe that the U.S. interest rate will revert to its equilibrium value fairly quickly. According to
the subjective parity condition, the dollar need only appreciate moderately. In the following period, the
U.S. interest rate turns out to be higher than investors ￿rst expected. This leads them to revise upward
their beliefs about the persistence of the original interest rate shock and triggers a further appreciation of
the dollar. We call this the updating eﬀect. If the updating eﬀect is strong enough to dominate the forward
premium eﬀect, there will be a gradual appreciation of the dollar. Eventually, there is not much more to
learn and the forward premium eﬀect must dominate. Thus, the exchange rate will revert to its equilibrium
value. Along this path, there is delayed overshooting, positive excess returns in the domestic currency, and
the forward premium is negatively correlated with expected appreciation.
It turns out that the same intuition carries over to an unconditional statement about the forward premium.
Furthermore, while the model predicts that the forwar dp r e m i u mb i a sa l w a y sa r i s e sa ss o o na si n v e s t o r s
overestimate the importance of transitory shocks, the most extreme form of this puzzle (a negative correlation
between the forward premium and the expected depreciation), and delayed overshooting, depend upon the
parameters of the model and the relative strength of the two eﬀects we just discussed. Intuitively then,
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importance of interest rate shocks and the gradual mean reversion of interest rates.
We do not, in this paper, take a stand on the origins of the distorted beliefs. What we do is develop a
uni￿ed model that allows us to link distorted beliefs about future interest rates to the two foreign exchange
puzzles described above. The only deviation from full rationality in the model is the misperception about the
relative variance of interest rate innovations. Given these beliefs, the exchange rate is determined optimally
￿and rationally. One important maintained assumption is that investors do not learn the true interest rate
process over time. Why should they fail to adjust their beliefs? Clearly, with Bayesian learning, convergence
to the true process would occur quite rapidly.5 However, this rapid learning is not compatible with the
persistent distortions that we document. Something else must be at work. While we do not propose a
full theory, we can oﬀer a few remarks. First, it is possible that agents are rational, but econometricians
condition upon a subset of the publicly available information. Such ￿Peso problem￿ is consistent with our
approach, although one would expect the biases to disappear as the sampling period extends.6 Another
possibility is that while investors know the true model, they fear misspeci￿cation, and use ￿robust control￿ to
make forecasts and portfolio decisions. This leads them to act as if the approximating model has an extra
￿ctitious sequence of transitory disturbances.7 Finally, we note that several recent papers have interpreted
distorted beliefs as cognitive biases, and have used them to explain asset pricing anomalies.8 Unlike these
papers, we carry out a direct empirical veri￿cation of the belief distortion that underlies our analysis.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 documents the empirical evidence on the objective and subjective
processes for interest rates. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are relegated to Appendix A2..
2. Model
We start from the standard log-linearized foreign exchange arbitrage condition:
Es
t et+1 − et = xt − ζt,x t := it − i∗
t (1)
where et is the log of the domestic price of the foreign currency Et, xt is the forward premium, equal to the
diﬀerence between the domestic one-period continuously compounded nominal interest rate it and its foreign
equivalent i∗
t,a n dζt is the domestic currency risk premium. Es
t et+1 represents the subjective expectation of
next period￿s exchange rate, which may diﬀer from statistical or rational expectations, denoted by Etet+1.
According to (1), the return on the short domestic bond, it, is equal to the return on a foreign bond ofExchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 5
t h es a m em a t u r i t y ,i∗
t, adjusted for the market￿s expectations of depreciation Es
t et+1 − et, as well as a risk
premium component ζt. Appendix A2. presents an aﬃne model of exchange rate determination consistent
with (1).
We de￿ne true foreign exchange expected excess returns as the rationally expected excess return on the
domestic currency:
Λt ≡ xt − (Etet+1 − et)=( Es
t et+1 − Etet+1)+ζt, (2)
where the second expression substitutes for xt using (1). According to (2), both expectation errors and risk
premia generate true predictable excess returns. The diﬀerence between subjective expected excess returns,
de￿ned as Λs
t ≡ xt − (Es
t et+1 − et)=ζt, and true expected excess returns is equal to the expectation error
term (Es
t et+1 − Etet+1).
Since subjective expectations and risk premia are not directly observed, the arbitrage relation (1) has no
empirical power as it stands. If we assume that expectations are rational (Es
t et+1 = Etet+1) and that there
is no risk premium (ζt =0 ), then the (rationally) expected rate of depreciation Etet+1 − et is equal to the
forward premium xt, and there are no predictable excess returns, true or subjective (Λt = Λs
t =0 ). This
Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) condition is the basis for all the empirical tests in the literature.
This paper focuses instead on expectational errors. Accordingly, we set the risk premium ζt to zero. It
follows that the subjective expected rate of depreciation equals the forward premium:
Es
t et+1 − et = xt. (3)
We will refer to (3) as ￿subjective UIP￿. In that case, while there are no subjective predictable excess returns
(Λs
t =0 ), true predictable returns can diﬀer from zero.
We take the forward premium xt as the primitive object in our analysis. For simplicity, assume that xt
follows an autoregresive process with autocorrelation λ and an i.i.d. innovation  t normally distributed with
mean zero and variance σ2
  :9
xt = λxt−1 +  t (4)
While (4) characterizes the true process, we allow agents to have the following beliefs about the forwardExchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 6
premium process:
xt = zt + vt, (5)
zt = λzt−1 +  t.
The only diﬀerence between the true and subjective processes is the i.i.d. term vt normally distributed with
mean 0 and variance σs2
v . When σs2
v =0 , (5) collapses to (4). When σs2
v > 0, investors perceive interest rate
changes as more transitory that they actually are. The diﬀerence between the true and subjective models
is fully parameterized by the ratio of variances ηs = σs2
v /σ2
  that represents the subjective beliefs about the
relative importance of transitory and persistent shocks. The true ratio satis￿es η = σ2
v/σ2
  =0 .
How should we interpret the shocks vt and  t? One possibility, consistent with sticky price models, is
that vt represents a relative velocity shock, and  t represents a permanent relative money supply shock.
A permanent reduction in money supply leads to an increase in domestic interest rates. As prices adjust
slowly over time, interest rates revert gradually toward their steady state value. This interpretation is
consistent with the results of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995).10 Alternatively, the shocks vt and  t can
capture the uncertainty surrounding the conduct of monetary policy. Both the monetary policy target and
the information set upon which Central Banks act are imperfectly known to the market.11 Transitory shocks
can occur when the Fed acts on inaccurate forecasts, or when the balance of power among the Open Market
Committee members shifts temporarily. Both elements are not observed by market participants who have
to infer the rationale behind the most recent policy decisions.
While investors act optimally conditional on their beliefs, we assume that they do not update these
beliefs over time in order to learn the true model. In other words, it is never the case that eventually
Es
t xt+1 = Etxt+1.W eo ﬀer three possible motivations for this assumption. First, this allows for a minimal
departure from the full-rational model. In other words, since our agents are rational in every other way, we
maintain a certain discipline. In particular, conditional on the perceived interest rate process (5), investors
eliminate any apparent arbitrage opportunity, so that subjective UIP (3) holds. Second, distorted beliefs
about σ2
v can be interpreted as a formalism to capture certain psychological biases as in behavioral ￿nance.12
Finally, suppose that agents know that (1)-(4) is indeed a good approximating model. However, they
fear misspeci￿cation and in order to guard against it agents use ￿robust control￿ to make forecasts and
portfolio decisions. This leads them to act as if the approximating model has an extra ￿ctitious sequenceExchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 7
of disturbances vt. As a result, their forecasts might resemble those derived using (5) instead of (4). Here
we take the misperception about σ2
v as a primitive. Our objective is to determine the extent to which this
distortion can explain the forward premium puzzle and delayed overshooting.
2.1. Market Forecasts
Every period, agents observe the realization of the forward premium xt and, given their beliefs (5), form
forecasts of future forward premia (Es
t xt+1) using Bayes law. The subjective interest parity condition (3)
then determines the exchange rate.
This forecasting problem is a standard signal extraction problem. Its solution is given by the following
lemma, which is a direct consequence of the properties of the Kalman Filter (see Hamilton (1994, chapter
13)).




1. market expectations of the forward premium evolve according to:
Es
t xt+1 =( 1 − kt)λEs
t−1xt + ktλxt, where (6)
σ2
t+1 =( 1 − kt)(λ
2σ2
t + σ2








  + σs2
v
≤ 1
2. in the limit as t →∞ , the conditional variance σ2
t+1 and the gain kt converge to steady state values σ2 and
k respectively, that satisfy:
k =
1+∆ − ηs ¡
1+λ
2¢
1+∆ + ηs ¡
1+λ
2¢ ; σ2 =
(1 − k)











2, and the beliefs evolve according to:
Es
t xt+1 =( 1− k)λEs
t−1xt + kλxt (7)
Forecasts of future forward premia Es
t xt+1 are a weighted average of last period￿s forecast, Es
t−1xt, and
the current forward premium xt. The gain kt represents the weight given to current observations relative
to past expectations while σ2
t+1 represents the conditional variance of the market belief about the persistent
component of the forward premium.Exchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 8
A c c o r d i n gt o( 6 ) ,w h e nσs2
v =0 , full weight is given to the current forward premium (kt =1 )and the
forecast equation collapses to rational expectations: Es
t xt+1 = λxt. When σs2
v > 0, some weight is given to
past forecasts (kt < 1) and subjective expectations of future forward premia under-react to changes in xt. It
is well-known that (6) resembles updating rules under adaptive expectations. Muth (1960) has shown that
if the underlying process can be represented as in (5), Bayesian updating takes the same form as adaptive
expectations. They key diﬀerence is that under the former the weights depend on the relative variances of
transitory and persistent components.





have converged to their steady state
¡
k,σ2¢
, and subjective beliefs satisfy (7).13 The steady state gain k
depends only on the misperception coeﬃcient (ηs) and the degree of persistence of the shocks (λ).I t i s
easy to verify that the gain is increasing in λ and that it decreases from 1 to 0 as ηs varies from 0 to ∞.
Intuitively, with a higher λ, the current forward premium contains more information about future values
of the persistent component zt. Hence xt gets more weight in the forecast. Given λ, there is a one-to-one
mapping between the agent￿s misperception and the weight given to past beliefs. We can thus indiﬀerently
analyze the properties of the system in terms of (λ,ηs) or in terms of (λ,k).
2.2. Equilibrium Exchange Rate
The equilibrium exchange rate is obtained by solving forward the subjective uncovered interest parity
condition (3): et =
PT−1
j=0 Es
t xt+j + Es
t et+T. Substituting recursively using (6), we obtain the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 The equilibrium exchange rate satis￿es:





where ﬂ et = limT→∞ Es
t et+T is the long-run equilibrium value of the exchange rate.
The exchange rate depends upon the current forward premium xt, its future expected value Es
t xt+1 and
the long-run equilibrium exchange rate ﬂ et.
Under rational expectations, agents do not misperceive a transitory component in the forward premium
(i.e., Es
t xt+1 = λxt)a n d( 8 )s i m p l i ￿es to:Exchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 9
er





t denotes the exchange rate that would obtain without distorted beliefs. According to (9), an increase
in domestic interest rates relative to foreign rates leads to an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate
relative to its long run equilibrium. More persistent interest rate shocks require a larger initial appreciation
of the currency in anticipation of larger future forward premia.
Substracting (9) from (8), the equilibrium exchange rate can be expressed as the rational expectation







With distorted beliefs, an increase in interest rate xt implies that Etxt+1 − Es
t xt+1 > 0, since subjective
forecasts underreact, so that the nominal exchange rate appreciates less than under rational expectations.
Intuitively, since investors underestimate future domestic interest rates, the currency appreciates less initially.
2.3. Foreign Exchange Market Anomalies
This section characterizes the parameter set (λ,k) over which our simple model explains both Eichenbaum
and Evans￿ delayed overshooting puzzle, as well as Fama￿s forward premium puzzle.
2.3.1. Predictable Excess Returns
In the absence of a risk premium, predictable excess returns on domestic currency originate exclusively
from forecast errors. Iterating equation (2) forward, we obtain









Predictable excess returns occur only if forecasts of the long run equilibrium exchange rate ﬂ et are incorrect,
or if market expectations of interest rate diﬀerentials xt diﬀer from their statistical expectations, at least
over some horizon.
While misperceptions about long run equilibrium values of the exchange rate may play some role in
explaining predictable returns, we focus in this paper on predictable returns generated by distorted beliefsExchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 10
about the interest rate. Consequently, we assume that Etﬂ et+1 = Es
t ﬂ et+1 =ﬂ et.14 Substituting (6) into (11),
we obtain the following result.









Positive predictable excess returns arise from forecast errors about future interest rates. The reason is
simple: if future forward premia are under-estimated, the currency is arti￿cially depreciated (see (10)) and
will subsequently appreciate. When expectations are rational, Λt =0 , as expected.
2.3.2. Delayed Overshooting
The delayed overshooting path is characterized by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) as the impulse response
of the exchange rate to an unanticipated monetary shock. In the context of our model, this corresponds to
the path that the exchange rate would follow if an innovation   were to take place at time t, followed by no
other shocks.15 Assume that the economy starts from steady state, with Es
t−1xt = Et−1xt =0 . According to
(4), the true forward premium follows xt+j = λ
j . Under rational expectations, the exchange rate obeys (9)
and satis￿es:
er





This path exhibits the standard Dornbusch (1976) overshooting result. Following an increase in domestic
interest rates relative to foreign rates ( >0), the exchange rate appreciates initially beyond its new equilib-
rium value, then depreciates gradually back at the same speed as the forward premium. We call this eﬀect
the forward premium eﬀect.
By contrast, with distorted beliefs (k<1), the response to a forward premium innovation   at time t is:





1 − λ(1 − k)j+1⁄
(14)
The term in λ
j captures the forward premium eﬀect as before. But there is another eﬀect. Consider again
the case of an increase in domestic interest rates relative to foreign interest rates. Initially, investors observe
xt =  >0. They do not know whether this increase is persistent or transitory and form forecasts of xt+1
a c c o r d i n gt o( 7 ) :Es
t xt+1 = kλ  < λ  = Etxt+1. As we argued above, this leads to a smaller initial appreciationExchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 11
of the exchange rate than under rational expectations. Consider now what happens at time t +1 . Investors




1 − (1 − k)
2·
λ
2 . This revision may exceed the original estimate kλ , leading investors to
believe that the persistent component has increased. This updating eﬀect leads to an appreciation of
the exchange rate. The term (1 − k)
j+1 in equation (14) re￿e c t st h i su p d a t i n ge ﬀect. Eventually, there is
nothing to be learned and the forward premium eﬀect must dominate. The humped exchange rate response
results from the interaction between the forward premium and the updating eﬀects.
Figure 1 shows the path of the exchange rate in response to an unanticipated increase in the forward
premium at t =0 , when k =0 .1 and λ =0 .98. The exchange rate appreciates for about 15 periods before
reverting back to its long run value. If one interprets each period as a month, this graph resembles the
impulse response functions estimated by Clarida and Gali (1994), Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Grilli
and Roubini (1994). Over what length of time does the exchange rate move in the ￿wrong￿ direction? The next
proposition characterizes delayed overshooting at horizon τ, i.e., the conditions under which |et+τ − ﬂ et+τ| >
|et+τ−1 − ﬂ et+τ−1|, as well as the ￿delayed overshooting region￿ Dτ at horizon τ in terms of the parameters λ
and k.
Proposition 4 . Delayed Overshooting:









2. Delayed overshooting at horizon τ occurs if the parameters (λ,k) belong to the delayed overshooting region








where φ =[ 1+( 1− k)
τ]
2 − 4(1− k)
τ+1.
Panel A of ￿gure 2 reports the lower boundary λ(k,τ) of Dτ as we vary τ f r o m1t o1 0p e r i o d s . A s
we increase the peak date τ, the conditions on λ and k become more stringent: the frontier of Dτ shifts
up. We see that higher λ makes delayed overshooting more likely, by slowing the forward premium eﬀect.
Changes in k have more complex eﬀects. As k approaches 1, the updating process works more and more
eﬃciently and beliefs converge to the true value very rapidly. In that case, the updating eﬀect is dominatedExchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 12
b yt h ef o r w a r dp r e m i u me ﬀect and there is no delayed overshooting. Conversely, for suﬃciently small k,
updating occurs very slowly and forward premia observations convey little information about their persistent
component. The subjective forecast Es
t xt+1 does not increase much at the time of the shock, or following
subsequent revisions. Delayed overshooting obtains for high persistence and low ￿but not too low￿ values of
k.
Finally, true predictable excess returns on the domestic currency following an unanticipated increase in





j+1 (1 − k)
j+1 ≥ 0 (16)
Comparing (16) with (14) we observe that there are always positive true predictable excess returns on the
domestic currency (Λt+j ≥ 0) as soon as beliefs are distorted (k<1), even if condition (15) is not satis￿ed.
2.3.3. The Forward Discount Puzzle
The previous discussion makes clear that there are conditional predictable excess returns. Are there also
unconditional predictable returns, or equivalently, a forward premium puzzle? Under the null of Uncovered
Interest Parity and rational expectations, the ￿Fama￿ regression
et+1 − et = α + βxt + ut+1 (17)
yields a slope coeﬃcient β equal to one. It is well known that these ￿Fama regressions￿ fare quite badly.
The estimated β, often called the ￿Fama coeﬃcient￿, is typically signi￿cantly smaller than one, and often
negative. The asymptotic value of the OLS coeﬃcient is equal to cov(et+1 − et,x t)/var (xt). In our model
economy this asymptotic limit is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 5 .T h e c o e ﬃcient of the regression of realized depreciation rates et+1 − et on the forward
premium xt converges in plim to
β0 =1−




One can verify directly that β0 declines monotonically with λ. This is intuitive since a larger value of
λ implies that any expectational error will lead to a more severe mispricing of the exchange rate. The
dependence on k is more complex. A low β0 requires a low k. However, when k =0 , which corresponds to
an environment where agents believe all shocks are purely transitory (η →∞ ), β0 is equal to 1−λ>0.T h eExchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 13
minimum of β0 is attained for small but strictly positive values of k.
When k<1 and 0 <λ≤ 1, the asymptotic value of the Fama coeﬃcient is strictly smaller than 1 and
the forward premium is a biased predictor of the future rate of depreciation of the currency. But, equation
(18) delivers a much stronger result. The second Panel B of ￿gure 2 reports a contour plot of β0 as function
of λ and k. We see from the graph that it can be negative for large values of λ and small ￿but not too small￿
values of k.
It is easy to understand why β0 must be smaller than 1.B yd e ￿nition, true expected depreciation is the
diﬀerence between the forward premium and predictable excess returns: Etet+1 − et = xt − Λt. Using (12)
and (6) to replace Λt by its equilibrium value, we obtain:



















> 0, expected depreciation responds by less than the forward premium. To understand what is
going on, consider again an increase in domestic interest rates, relative to foreign rates. As we have seen, the
currency initially appreciates less than under rational expectations. Hence, the true expected depreciation is
smaller than that implied by the forward premium, and there are positive predictable excess returns. This
is true whenever 0 <λ≤ 1 and η>0.16
Yet, we also found that β0 can be negative, which is a much stronger result. How can this be? According






can exceed the coeﬃcient on the forward premium (equal to 1), as predictable excess returns become more
volatile. In that case, the initial mispricing of the exchange rate is so large that it requires the exchange
rate to appreciate further in the future. As agents update their beliefs, they realize the change in interest
rates is more persistent than initially anticipated. This upward revision in beliefs has a large eﬀect on the
exchange rate because agents expect high domestic interest rates to persist in the future. As a results we
get an extreme scenario where a high domestic interest rate coexists with an appreciating currency. In other
w o r d s ,t h ef o r w a r dp r e m i u ma n dt h et r u ee x p e c t e dd e p r e c i a t i o nm o v ei no p p o s i t ed i r e c t i o n s . T h u s ,β0 is
negative.
The previous discussion abstracted from the term Es
t−1xt. But past expected forward premia are correlated
with the current forward premium. Indeed, one obtains (18) exactly when the correlation is properly takenExchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 14
into account. This term dampens the movements in predictable excess returns and makes it more diﬃcult
for β0 to turn negative (compare the term in xt in (19) and the Fama coeﬃcient).
To sum up, our analysis has strong cross-sectional implications. Countries should exhibit unconditional
delayed overshooting and the forward discount puzzle in its most extreme form (i.e., a negative Fama coeﬃ-
cient), if (a) monetary shocks have high conditional persistence (high λ), and (b) the degree of misperception
(1 − k) is high, but not too high. Further, our analysis indicates that there are always positive predictable
excess returns at short horizons (Λt > 0), even if there is no delayed overshooting.
2.3.4. The Volatility and Persistence Puzzles
17
Backus, Gregory and Telmer (1993), Bekaert (1996) and Moore and Roche (2002) observe that exchange
rate changes are many times more variable than predictable excess returns, which are in turn much more
variable than the forward premium:
var(∆et+1) >v a r(Λt) >v a r(xt) (20)
This is the volatility puzzle. These authors also emphasize that the forward premium xt is much more
persistent than exchange rate changes ∆et+1 :
AC (∆et) >A C(xt) (21)
where AC (x) denotes the autocorrelation of x. This is the persistence puzzle. A successful exchange rate
model must also account for these volatility and persistence puzzles.
We compute the variances involved in (20) in the context of our misperception model, assuming that
the long term exchange rate remains constant ﬂ et =ﬂ e =0 .P a n e l A o f ￿gure 3 reports the ratio of the
unconditional volatility of predictable excess returns to the unconditional volatility of the forward premium
(var(Λt)/var(xt)), as a function of λ for various values of k. When λ =0 , there are no predictable excess
returns, hence the ratio is zero. As λ increases, we see that the relative volatility increases, eventually
exceeding one. Thus, for high values of λ, our model is able to account for the second inequality in the
volatility puzzle (20).
Panel B reports the ratio of the unconditional volatility of the depreciation rate to the unconditionalExchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 15
volatility of the forward premium, var(∆et+1)/var(xt).W h e nλ =0 , t h ee x c h a n g er a t es a t i s ￿es et = −xt, so
that var(∆et+1)/var(xt)=2 .A sλ increases, this ratio might increase or decrease, depending upon k.When
k =0 ,e t = −xt so that var(∆et)/var (xt)=2( 1− λ) decreases with λ. When k =1 ,e t = −xt/(1 − λ),
and var(∆et)/var (xt)=2 /(1 − λ) can become very large for large λ. Importantly, for the values of λ and
k that can explain the Fama puzzle and delayed overshooting, (high λ, small k), we can ￿nd large relative
variances, so that our model can also account for the ￿rst inequality of the volatility puzzle (compare the
scale of the top two panels of Figure 3 ). In sum, our model is able to reproduce the ranking in (20) and
explain the volatility puzzle for high values of λ and low values of k.
To account for the persistence puzzle, we observe ￿rst that the true correlation of the forward premium
is always equal to λ. Panel C of ￿gure 3 reports the correlation of the rate of depreciation, AC (∆et). This
correlation increases with λ. For λ =0 , it is equal to −0.5 since et = −xt. For k =0and k =1it is equal to
−(1 − λ)/2. For intermediate values of k, the correlation can become positive, but remains always smaller
than λ. Hence, the model can also account for the persistence puzzle (21).
3. What Do the Data Say, What Does the Market Think?
The simple model of the previous section accounts for all the puzzles as the consequence of a systematic
and speci￿c distortion in investor￿s beliefs about the interest rate process. This section ￿nds strong evidence
in support of this hypothesis. Our empirical strategy is as follows: we start by estimating a generalized
version of the true empirical process according to (5) using 3-months eurorates for all G-7 eurorates against
the 3-months eurodollar. In all cases, we ￿nd that η = σ2
v/σ2
  =0 , while λ is close to 1. Then, using
two diﬀerent sources of interest rate forecasts, we estimate the subjective process (5) and show that ηs is
signi￿cantly positive for most G-7 currencies against the U.S. dollar, and often larger than 1. We conclude
that there is strong evidence of the type of subjective distortion that is necessary to explain the empirical
puzzles. Finally, we show that the size of the bias induced by this belief distortion is suﬃcient to account
for the empirical evidence on delayed overshooting, forward premium, persistence and volatility puzzles.Exchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 16
3.1. What Do the Data Say?
We start from a more general version of the empirical process for the forward premium of Section 2.
Instead of equation (5), we consider:18
xt = zt + vt (22)
λ(L) zt =  t,
where vt is the transitory component and zt is the persistent one, following an AR(p) process with λ(L)=
1 −
Pp
i=1 λiLi. The disturbances  t and vt are independently and normally distributed with mean 0 and
variance σ2
v and σ2
 , respectively. Equation 22 provides a ￿exible parametric representation of the interest
rate process. If σ2
v =0 , it is equivalent to an AR(p);i fσ2
  =0 , it reduces to a white noise process; ￿nally, if
the lag polynomial λ(L) admits roots on the unit circle, xt is integrated.
Equation (22) and the distributional assumptions on vt and  t de￿ne a standard state-space process.
The parameter vector θ0 ≡ ({λi}
p
i=1 ,σ ,η) can readily be estimated by Maximum Likelihood (see Hamilton
(1994, chapter 13)).19
Our data set consists of monthly observations on the 3-months eurorates for Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan and the U.K., evaluated against the 3-months eurodollar. The sample period is 1986:8 to 1995:10
for a total of 111 observations.20 Figure 4 reports the interest rate diﬀerential for all six countries against the
U.S., over the sample period, together with the 3-months eurodollar. Table 1 presents Maximum Likelihood
estimates of the relevant parameters for p =1to 4. A value of 0 for η indicates that the constraint η ≥ 0 is
binding, and the corresponding AR(p) process, estimated directly, maximizes the likelihood.
First, we observe that the long run autocorrelation Σλ is very high, ranging from 0.95 for U.S.-Canada
to 1.01 for U.S.-Japan. Second, there is no evidence of a transitory component in the forward premium.
More speci￿cally, in all cases except U.S.-Canada, the constraint η ≥ 0 binds, implying σ2
v =0 .21 These
results imply that the forward premium is best characterized as following a very persistent AR process. In
the AR(1) case, this corresponds to the process (4).
Since we ￿nd very persistent autocorrelations, Table 1 reports a Phillips-Perron test of non-stationarity
for the forward premium (See Hamilton (1994, chapter 17)). The statistic Zt tests the null (α =0 ,β=1 )
of the regression xt = α+βxt−1 +εt.22 The table reports the associated p−value. The results indicate thatExchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 17
we can reject the null for all pairs at conventional levels of signi￿cance, except U.S.-Italy and U.S.-Germany.
Although the forward premium is very persistent, it does not appear to be integrated.
3.2. What Does the Market Think?
Part I: Consensus Forecasts
Given an initial estimate for the persistent component E0z1, we can use equation (7) to construct forecasts







 ,ηs).23 Consider for instance the AR(1) case: zt = λ
szt−1+ t. The τ-period ahead forecast
of the forward premium satis￿es: Es
t xt+τ = Es
t zt+τ =( λ
s)
τ−1 Es
t zt+1. Using equation (7) and iterating back
to the beginning of the sample, we can write:
Es










j (1 − k)




 ≡ Et (xt+τ|θ
s) (23)
The forecasts Es
t xt+τ are a function of θ
s, the initial belief E0z1, and the history of forward premia up to
time t, {xs}
t
s=1 . If we assume that forecasts are formed according to (23), we can estimate the parameter
vector θ
s that is consistent with these forecasts and the forward premium process.24 Speci￿cally, suppose
that we observe forecast data at time t and horizon τ, xτ
t, with some classical measurement error ut:
xτ
t = Et (xt+τ|θ
s)+ut (24)
Under the assumption that ut is normally distributed with mean 0, variance σ2
u, a n du n c o r r e l a t e dw i t ht h e
true forecast, we can estimate θ
s by Maximum Likelihood.
We construct the empirical counterpart of xτ
t using Eurorates consensus forecasts at 3, 6 and 12 months
from the Financial Times Currency Forecaster. The data is available monthly from August 1986 to October
1995. Contributors include multinational companies as well as forecasting services from major investment
banks, i.e., the most active players on the ￿xed income and foreign exchange markets.25 The monthly
publication collects interest rates and their forecasts and reports a ￿market average￿ weighting individual
forecasts according to their relative importance. We construct forecasts of the forward premium xt by







reports the 3, 6 and 12 months forecasts for all country pairs against the U.S. dollar.Exchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 18
A few remarks are in order when using survey data. First, while there is substantial heterogeneity in
forecasts, ￿market expectations￿ may possess better statistical properties than individual forecasts, as the
idiosyncratic noise ￿washes out￿ in the aggregation process. Second, a recent theoretical literature has empha-
sized that there may be systematic biases in individual forecasts: forecasters who care about their reputation,
may have incentives to use forecasts in order to manipulate their clients￿s belief regarding their ability. How-
ever, the empirical importance and direction of such reputational biases remains an open question.26 While
we recognize the importance of these considerations, we do not ￿nd any compelling reason to believe that
consensus forecast are systematically biased and we maintain the assumption that ut is uncorrelated with
market forecasts.
Table 2 presents the results when we pool all forecast horizons.27 The estimates of the long run au-
tocorrelation Σλ
s are very similar to the original estimates ranging from 0.95 to 1.00. More importantly,
we ￿nd signi￿cant estimates of the relative variance ηs for most pairs, except U.S.-Germany (AR(1)) and
U.S.-Canada (AR(3)). Since we have seen that η =0in the data generating process, a positive estimate
of ηs implies that investors systematically misperceive interest rate shocks to be more transitory than what
they actually are. Note also that in many cases ηs > 1. This indicates that investors believe ￿erroneously￿
that transitory shocks represent the largest fraction of interest rate innovations.
Part II: Using the Term Structure
As an alternative to consensus forecasts, we construct interest rate forecasts from the forward rates
implicit in the term structure. Denote in
t the continuously compounded annualized yield on a n − period
euro deposit.28 According to the log-linearized version of the term structure, the n-months ahead k-periods
forward rate at time t, denoted fk










t .29 Under the rational expectations
hypothesis of the term structure, this forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the k-months interest rate at
time t + n : fk
n,t = Etik
t+n. We use fk
n,t in place of the consensus forecast Es
t ik
t+n to estimate θ
s.
We use monthly data on the 3, 6 and 9 months eurorates for all G-7 countries to construct the 3 and
6 months-ahead forward premium on the 3-month eurorate. Table 3 presents the Maximum Likelihood
estimates of θ
s analogous to table 2, for p =1to 4.
While the results are slightly weaker than using consensus forecasts, we still ￿nd strong evidence of
misperception for p =2to p =4 . For all country-pairs, except U.S.-Canada (p =2and 4), and U.S.-Italy
(p =3 ), we estimate ηs > 0.I nm a n yi n s t a n c e s ,w ea l s o￿nd that ηs > 1.30Exchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 19
3.3. Is it Big Enough?
The previous subsection established that ηs > 0 for most country pairs against the U.S. As Section 2
makes clear, ηs > 0 is a necessary, but not a suﬃcient, condition for the exchange rate puzzles that we seek
to explain. To illustrate how much of these puzzles our simple model is able to account for, we report in
Table 4 estimates of the gain of the ￿lter k, the delayed overshooting horizon τ, the Fama coeﬃcient β,
and the volatility and persistence ratios for the AR(2) estimates of Table 2. The ￿rst line for each country
reports the empirical estimates from the data.31
We ￿nd that the model is qualitatively able to reproduce all stylized facts. The gain k ranges between 0.27
(U.S.-Italy) and 0.68 (U.S.-Canada), implying substantial amounts of underreaction. Based on the degree of
misperception, we would predict a signi￿cant delayed overshooting ranging from 2.25 months (U.S.-Canada)
to 13.45 months (U.S.-Italy), lower than the Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) estimates, ranging from 24
months to 38 months. Our model predicts signi￿cantly negative estimates for all exchange rates except
U.S.-Canada. This is in line with empirical estimates of the Fama regression except the for the dollar-Lira.
We ￿nd also large excess volatility of the rate of depreciation compared to the forward premium. The
empirical estimates range from 30.02 (U.S.-Canada) to 109.65 (U.S.-Japan), while the implied estimates
range from 20 (U.S.-Canada) to 80.4 (U.S.-Italy). The model also implies that predictable excess returns
Λt are more volatile than the forward premium xt, although the ratio is often larger than the empirical
estimates.
Finally, the model-implied autocorrelation of the rate of depreciation AC (∆et), between 0.25 and 0.72,
are always lower than the autocorrelation of the forward premium (λ, from table 2), but larger than the
empirical counterpart, from -0.06 to 0.08.
Overall, we ￿nd these results quite striking, especially if one keeps in mind that we only use information
about the subjective interest rate process to explain foreign exchange market puzzles. We conclude that,
despite its simplicity, our model captures salient features of exchange rate behavior.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we establish a link between exchange rate and interest rate anomalies. We develop a
nominal exchange rate determination model in which investors constantly try to determine whether interest
rate shocks are transitory or persistent. We demonstrate that if investors misperceive shocks to be moreExchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 20
transitory than what they actually are, the equilibrium exchange rate in the model can account for four
anomalies present in the data: the forward premium puzzle in its most extreme form ￿ a negative Fama
coeﬃcient, delayed overshooting, as well as the variance and persistence puzzles. We then show that the
data strongly supports the existence of this misperception. Furthermore, we show that for the degree of
misperception that we estimate, we can account for a large portion of the puzzles.
The dynamics of the exchange rate are determined by two eﬀects which act in opposite directions: a
forward premium eﬀect and a updating eﬀect. The ￿rst eﬀect is standard. As in other models, it derives
from the mean reverting nature of interest rates diﬀerentials. The updating eﬀect is novel, and derives from
the fact that agents constantly try to determine whether interest rate shocks are transitory or persistent.
The predictable excess returns and hump-shaped dynamics, implied by the currency market anomalies, can
result if and only if agents misperceive interest rate shocks to be more transitory than what they actually
are.
This interpretation, which is new to our knowledge, has important implications. It provides a clear
analytical characterization of the factors in￿uencing exchange rate responses to monetary shocks. It also
serves the useful purpose of uncovering a deeper rationale for a variety of asset market pathologies. In
particular, the misperceptions we identify raise the interesting prospect of an integrated understanding of
currency and bond markets.
Of course, this paper also raises some intriguing questions: why do agents fail to revise their erroneous
beliefs about second moments? Can these misperceptions be arbitraged away or taken advantage of by
savvier investors? Ultimately, of course, we will need to reconcile observed behavior with models of optimal
behavior. While we may not be there yet, this paper indicates a promising avenue of research.Exchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 21
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A2. An Aﬃne Model of Exchange Rate Determination
This appendix presents a simple aﬃne model of exchange rate determination under complete markets,
similar to Backus, Foresi and Telmer (1998). The economy consists of two countries, each with its own
currency. In each country, nominal assets are traded. The absence of pure arbitrage opportunities implies
the existence of [a] positive nominal pricing kernels for claims in domestic and foreign currency, Mt,t+1 and
M∗











t+1) is the gross rate of return -in domestic(foreign) currency- on any traded asset between











Let Et denote the domestic price of foreign currency (so that an increase in Et corresponds to a depre-
ciation of the domestic currency). Under complete markets, and with identical preferences across countries,






This equation pins down the rate of depreciation, not the level of the exchange rate. Taking logs, letting
et =l o g ( Et), and substituting for the domestic and foreign nominal interest rates gives a general form of the
foreign exchange arbitrage condition:
Es
t et+1 − et = xt + ζt, (A.4)













t logMt,t+1 − logEs
t {Mt,t+1})
We assume that the pricing kernels follow log-normal processes:
lnMt,t+1 = −lnR −
ﬂ ϕ2σ2
2
− δ ﬂ zt −
ϕ2σ2
2
− zt − ﬂ ϕﬂ  t+1 − ϕ  t+1 (A.5)
lnM∗








t − ﬂ ϕ∗ﬂ  t+1 − ϕ∗ ∗
t+1, (A.6)
where the elements of †t+1 =
¡
ﬂ  t+1,  t+1,  ∗
t+1
¢0 are independent and normally distributed with mean 0 and
variance σ2
 .32 The positive parameters δ,δ
∗,ϕ,ϕ ∗, ﬂ ϕ and ﬂ ϕ∗ represent the loadings on the various shocks;
R is a strictly positive scalar; ﬂ zt and ﬂ  t+1 represent the predictable and unpredictable components of a
shock common to both countries, while (zt,  t+1) and
¡
z∗
t ,  ∗
t+1
¢
represent the predictable and unpredictable
components of country-speci￿cs h o c k s .
We assume that the state zt =( ﬂ zt,z t,z∗
t )
0 obeys the following AR process:
λ(L)zt+1 = †t+1 (A.7)Exchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 24
where λ(L) is the polynomial in the lag operator of order p :1−
Pp
i=1 λiLi. Assumption (A.7) imposes that
each component of zt+1 has the same autocorrelogram. This can easily be relaxed. From (A.5)-(A.6), the
interest rate and depreciation rates satisfy:
xt =( δ − δ
∗)ﬂ zt + zt − z∗
t ≡ ￿ zt (A.8)
Es
t {et+1} − et = xt + ζ (A.9)
The forward premium is a function of ￿ zt only. ￿ zt follows an AR(p) with innovation ￿  t =( δ − δ










 . The risk premium ζ is constant and equal to
¡
ﬂ ϕ2 − ﬂ ϕ∗2 + ϕ2 − ϕ∗2¢
σ2
 /2.
It depends upon the variance of the innovations and the loading factors. Since this risk premium is not
time-varying, it is irrelevant for our analysis. We set it to 0 by assuming ﬂ ϕ =ﬂ ϕ∗ and ϕ = ϕ∗, implying that
subjective uncovered interest parity (3) holds exactly.
The previous assumptions imply that xt follows an AR(p) process:
λ(L)xt = λ(L)￿ zt =￿  t (A.10)
A2.1. Distorted Beliefs
Assume that investors assume that the pricing kernels satisfy:
lnMs





where vt and v∗
t are independent normally distributed shocks with mean 0 and variance σs2
v /2. Interest and
exchange rates are still determined by (A.2), and the exchange rate still satis￿es (A.3), with Ms and M∗,s
in place of M and M∗.
According to (A.2), the forward premium satis￿es:
xt =￿ zt +￿ vt (A.12)
where ￿ vt = vt − v∗
t. Equation (A.12) generalizes equation (5) in Section 2 since ￿ zt follows an AR(p).
A2.2. Updating
Given their beliefs, agents form forecasts of future forward premia using Bayes law. The system (xt, ￿ zt)
de￿nes a state-space system. We rewrite it in canonical form as follows:
xt = H0￿ zt +￿ vt
￿ zt = F￿ zt−1 +￿ †t
where ￿ zt =( ￿ zt, ￿ zt−1,..., ￿ zt−p+1)
0, ￿ †t =( ￿  t,0,....,0), H0 =( 1 ,0,...,0) and F is de￿ned so that (A.10) holds
(when p =1 , F = λ). The following lemma is a direct application of chapter 13 in Hamilton (1994) and
characterizes the evolution of these subjective beliefs.





.T h e n :
1 .B e l i e f se v o l v ea c c o r d i n gt o :
Es
t￿ zt+1 = FEs




















in particular, it does not depend upon the actual realizations of the forward premium xt.Exchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 25












and the beliefs evolve according to:
Es
t￿ zt+1 = FEs










t xt+1 = H0FEs









Two special cases are of interest. First, when expectations are rational, σs2




i=1 λixt+1−i, as expected. Second, in the case of an AR(1), the formula simpli￿es to:
Es








t+1 =( 1− kt)(λ
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  + σs2
v
and we obtain lemma 1 as a special case.
A2.3. Equilibrium Exchange Rate










t et+T. If we substitute the equation for subjective beliefs (A.14), we
obtain:
et =ﬂ et − xt + H0 (F − I)
−1 Es
t￿ zt+1 (A.15)
where ﬂ et,d e ￿ned as limT→∞ Es
t et+T, is the long run equilibrium exchange rate. Under rational expectations,
Etxt+1 = Et￿ zt+1 = F￿ zt = Fxt where xt =( xt,x t−1,...,xt−p+1), and the exchange rate follows:
er
t =ﬂ et − xt + H0 (F − I)
−1 Fxt (A.16)
So that we can rewrite:
et = er
t + H0 (F − I)
−1 (Es
t￿ zt+1 − Fxt)
I nt h ec a s ew h e r ep =1 , the formula simpli￿es to equation (8):











A2.4. Exchange Rate Anomalies
True predictable returns are de￿ned as: Λt = Es
t et+1 − Etet+1 where the second expectation is taken












where Etxt+1 = H0Fxt. Predictable excess returns depend linearly upon the misperception in short term
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Delayed overshooting: Consider an innovation ￿   in the forward premium at time t, assuming that xt−j =
0 for j>0. At time t + j, the forward premium is equal to Fj￿ † where ￿ † =( ￿  ,0,...,0)
0 . Substituting into
(A.16), the exchange rate under rational expectations follows
er
t+j =ﬂ et+j − H0
‡




which reduces to (13) in the AR(1) case:
er





When beliefs are distorted, the exchange rate can be obtained from (A.15) and (A.13). In the AR(1) case,
the formula simpli￿es. We observe ￿rst that
Es
t+jxt+j+1 = λ(1 − k)Es
t+j−1xt+j + λ
j+1k￿  
Iterating back to Es











1 − (1 − k)
j+1·
￿  
T h ee x c h a n g er a t et h e ns a t i s ￿es equation (14):



















1 − λ(1 − k)
¶
Forward premium puzzle: We calculate the value of the Fama coeﬃcient as β0 = cov (∆et+1,x t)/var (xt)
for the AR(1) case.33
β0 =





Using the de￿nition of Λt, we see that
cov (Λt,x t)=φ0cov(Etxt+1 − Es
t xt+1,x t)
















t−2xt−1 + λkxt−1,x t−1
¢
= λ















2 (1 − k)
¢−1
λkvar(xt)
Substituting back, we obtain equation (18):
β0 =1−
λ(1 − λ(1 − k))(1 − k)(1+λ)
1 − λ
2 (1 − k)
Volatility: Assuming that ﬂ et =0 , t h er a t eo fd e p r e c i a t i o no f the exchange rate satis￿es:
∆et+1 = et+1 − et
= xt + φ0 (Es
t xt+1 − xt+1)
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Notes
1See Hodrick (1988) and Lewis (1995) for surveys.
2Empirically, the forward premium puzzle is much more prevalent. The results of Clarida and Gali
(1994), Grilli and Roubini (1994) nuance the original results of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and indicate
that delayed overshooting may not occur for all country pairs.
3See Lewis (1995) and Frankel and Rose (1995) for surveys. Using survey data on exchange rate fore-
casts, Frankel and Froot (1989) decomposed predictable excess returns into their currency risk premium
and expectational error components. Their results indicate that most of the forward premium bias can be
attributed to expectational errors.
4See Moore and Roche (2002).
5Models with learning about a one-time change in regime have been analyzed by Lewis (1989). In these
models, investors gradually update their beliefs about the current state of the world, generating systematic
forecast errors following a change in regime. These models can explain part of the exchange rate mispre-
dictions, although not the more extreme form where expected depreciation and forward premium move in
opposite directions. Models of learning about infrequent regime shifts have very short transitional dynamics.
They do not account for the fact that predictable excess returns do not appear to die out over time between
infrequent regime switches.
6Kaminski (1993) shows that Peso problems can account for part of the forward discount premium.
7Tornell (2002) considers such a setup to explain some foreign exchange market anomalies. Hansen,
Sargent and Tallarini (1999) use Robust Control to explain macroeconomic anomalies.
8See Abel (2002), Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Cecchetti, Lam and Mark (2000) and Hong and
Stein (1999).
9Appendix A2. presents a more complex interest rate process.
10We do not want to push this interpretation too far. One reason is that the empirical literature on money,
output and interest rates tries to separate the exogenous and endogenous components of money shocks. Our
univariate representation does not allow for this distinction.Exchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 29
11In the U.S., investors have access to the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee meetings with
a six weeks delay. The full transcript is only available after 3 years.
12Recent models include Hong and Stein (1999), Barberis et al. (1998), Cecchetti et al. (2000) and Abel
(2002).
13This occurs rather fast (see Hamilton (1994)).
14The last equality follows from the de￿nition of ﬂ et.
15Since the forward premium follows (4), this is the impulse response to the true unconditional shock to
the economy.
16If interest rates follow a white noise process (λ =0 ) , there are no forecast misperceptions (since the
agents are biased in favor of a white noise to start with) and no predictable currency movements.
17We thank Michael Moore for encouraging us to look at these two additional puzzles.
18See Appendix A2..
19The estimation is performed using Gauss￿s constrained maximum likelihood (CML) module. In practice,
we maximize the likelihood for given values of the initial ￿unobserved￿ persistent shock E0z1. We then use
the smoother of the Kalman ￿lter to form revised estimates of z1, ETz1. We iterate back and forth between
the Maximum Likelihood and the smoother of the ￿lter until convergence.
20The sample coverage and period is driven by the availability of forecast data for all G-7 countries over
that same period. Gourinchas and Tornell (2002) reports results for a longer sample period. The results are
unchanged.
21For Canada-U.S., the estimated η (0.22) is not signi￿cantly diﬀerent from 0.
22Because unit root tests lack power, we report Philipps-Perron tests using a longer sample: 1973:01 to
2003:03.
23In this section, we allow investors to hold subjective beliefs about λ, as well as σ2
 , in addition to η. It
is easy to show that misperceptions about η are necessary for the puzzle to occur.
24In practice, we estimate θ
s conditional on the true estimate E0z1, estimated in the previous section. InExchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 30
long enough sample, this is unlikely to matter.
25The Forecasting services that contribute to the Currency Forecaster￿s Digest are: Predex, Merril Lynch,
Mellon Bank, Harris Trust, Bank of America, Morgan Grenfell, Chase Manhattan, Royal Bank of Canada,
Midland Montagu, Generale de Banque, MMS International, Chemical Bank, Union Bank of Switzerland,
Multinational Computer Models, Goldman Sachs International, Business International, M. Murenbeeld, and
Westpac Bank. The multinational companies that contribute are: General Electric, Du Pont, WR Grace,
Allied Signal, Monsanto, Ingersoll-Rand, General-Motors, Data General, Eli Lilly, Aetna, American Express,
Johnson and Johnson, Sterling Drug, Firestone, 3M, Union Carbide, Texaco, United Brands, SmithKline
Beckman, American National Can, RJ Reynolds, Colgate-Palmolive, Warner-Lambert, Schering-Plough,
Quaker Oats, Beatrice Foods, Hercules, Baxter Travenol, and Interpublic Group.
26Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) ￿nd that models of strategic bias are rejected by the data.
27Results are similar at the 3, 6 and 12 months horizons separately. See Gourinchas and Tornell (2002)
for details.
28Formally, in
t =l n ( 1+Y n
t ) where Y n
t is the yield to maturity. Since short term eurodeposits bear no
coupons, their duration equals their maturity.
29See Shiller, Campbell and Schoenholtz (1983).
30There are good reasons to view the results of Table 3 with some caution. By analogy with equation (1), we












is the forward premium on the term structure at horizon n for maturity k. The interpretation is similar
to equation (1): the forward premium fpk
n,t provides unbiased estimates of the market forecasts if it is
uncorrelated with the risk premium ζ
k
n,t. Under the assumption that the consensus forecasts are unbiased




t = α + βfpk
n,t +  k
n,t. Under the null that ζ
k
n,t is uncorrelated with the forward
premium, we expect β =1 .I fβ<1, we would infer that the risk premium and the forward premium are
positively correlated. We have run this regression on our sample (results available from the authors) and
found systematic evidence that there is a strong risk premium component in the term structure. Froot (1989)
obtains similar results using diﬀerent market forecasts.
31Empirical estimates for the delayed overshooting horizon (τ) are from Eichenbaum and Evans (1995),Exchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 31
Table Ib, line 9. Estimates for β are from Gourinchas and Tornell (2002), table 1. An estimate of var(Λ) is
constructed from the variance of the ￿tted values of a regression of realized excess returns et+3 −et −xt on
xt.T h ec o e ﬃciant from this regression is estimated as the sum of cross-correlations between ∆et+3, ∆et+2,
∆et+1 and xt, times the ratio of the standard deviation of ∆et+1 and the standard deviation of xt. The
sample period is 1974:1 to 1999:12.
32w.l.og. we can assume that all the innovations have the same variance since each innovation is scaled.
33The general case can be solved similarly. However, there is no closed-form solution.Exchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 32
AR(1) AR(2)
Country pair λη Log-lik. Σλη Log-lik. Zt
U.S.-Canada 0.95 0.22 -0.28 0.95 0- 0 . 2 2- 3 . 3 3
(0.03) (0.23) (0.03) [0.01]
U.S.-France 0.96 0 -0.44 0.96 0- 0 . 4 3- 4 . 9 4
(0.04) (0.04) [0.00]
U.S.-Germany 0.99 00 . 1 0 0.99 0 0.14 -2.51
(0.01) (0.01) [0.11]
U.S.-Italy 0.98 0 -0.48 0.98 0- 0 . 4 7- 2 . 1 6
(0.02) (0.02) [0.22]
U.S.-Japan 1.01 00 . 1 9 1.00 0 0.21 -2.92
(0.01) (0.01) [0.04]
U.S.-U.K. 0.98 0 -0.27 0.98 0- 0 . 2 6- 3 . 9 9
(0.02) (0.01) [0.00]
AR(3) AR(4)
Σλη Log-lik. Σλη Log-lik.
U.S.-Canada 0.92 0 -0.22 0.91 0- 0 . 2 2
(0.04) (0.04)
U.S.-France 0.96 0 -0.43 0.98 0- 0 . 4 1
(0.04) (0.03)
U.S.-Germany 0.99 00 . 1 3 0.99 00 . 1 7
(0.01) (0.01)
U.S.-Italy 0.99 0 -0.47 0.99 0- 0 . 4 7
(0.01) (0.02)
U.S.-Japan 1.00 00 . 2 2 1.00 00 . 2 2
(0.01) (0.01)
U.S.-U.K. 0.97 0 -0.25 0.99 0- 0 . 2 4
(0.02) (0.01)
Table 1: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the State-Space Representation of the 3-months Eurorates. Zt







U.S.-Canada 0.97 2.81 0.312 0.95 0.67 0.331 312
(0.004) (0.59) (0.007) (0.07)
U.S.-France 0.97 0.94 -0.286 0.99 7.97 -0.222 237
(0.003) (0.19) (0.001) (0.84)
U.S.-Germany 0.98 0.08 0.273 0.99 7.21 0.434 312
(0.002) (0.07) (0.001) (1.51)
U.S.-Italy 0.99 1.36 -0.415 1.00 9.68 -0.368 216
(0.004) (0.27) (0.001) (3.03)
U.S.-Japan 0.98 0.20 0.530 0.99 3.11 0.600 306
(0.002) (0.07) (0.001) (1.08)
U.S.-U.K. 0.98 0.57 0.193 0.99 8.58 0.279 306







U.S.-Canada 0.92 0.11 0.348 0.90 0.03 0.373
(0.007) (0.04) (0.008) 0.03
U.S.-France 0.99 17.94 0.011 0.98 4.08 0.032
(0.001) (6.37) (0.001) (0.67)
U.S.-Germany 0.99 4.55 0.533 0.99 2.82 0.545
(0.002) (1.49) (0.002) (1.13)
U.S.-Italy 0.99 2.67 -0.342 0.99 0.09 -0.216
(0.002) (1.24) (0.001) (0.08)
U.S.-Japan 0.98 1.49 0.676 0.98 0.54 0.686
(0.001) (0.38) (0.003) (0.22)
U.S.-U.K. 0.99 29.51 0.371 0.97 0.85 0.339
(0.001) (5.55) (0.003) (0.36)







U.S.-Canada 0.95 0.36 0.970 0.95 0.26 0.970 220
(0.006) (0.37) (0.006) (0.15)
U.S.-France 0.93 0 0.225 0.95 0.59 0.225 150
(0.01) (0.002) (0.13)
U.S.-Germany 0.98 0 0.303 0.99 2.05 0.742 220
(0.003) (0.001) (0.91)
U.S.-Italy 0.97 0 0.221 0.98 1.06 0.285 220
(0.003) (0.002) (0.31)
U.S.-Japan 0.99 0 1.535 0.99 1.06 1.692 150
(0.004) (0.001) (0.23)








U.S.-Canada 0.96 0.18 1.052 0.95 0 1.055
(0.004) (0.06) (0.004)
U.S.-France 0.96 2.63 0.293 0.97 4.44 0.318
(0.004) (0.77) (0.004) (2.15)
U.S.-Germany 0.99 1.24 0.808 0.99 0.94 0.837
(0.001) (0.56) (0.001) (0.30)
U.S.-Italy 0.97 0.04 0.252 0.98 1.31 0.305
(0.003) (0.11) (0.002) (0.56)
U.S.-Japan 0.99 1.18 1.710 0.99 2.19 1.830
(0.001) (0.51) (0.001) (0.32)
U.S.-U.K. 0.98 0.72 0.655 0.98 0.68 0.671
(0.002) (0.34) (0.002) (0.26)






U.S.-Canada data NA -0.87 30.02 4.69 -0.06
implied 0.68 2.25 0.42 20.15 1.89 0.25
(0.02) (0.16) (0.03) (2.95) (0.34) (0.02)
U.S.-France data 37.47 -0.16 53.13 1.57 0.01
implied 0.29 9.41 -0.36 28.10 14.67 0.68
(0.01) (0.38) (0.02) (2.36) (0.79) (0.01)
U.S.-Germany data 35.30 -0.50 71.08 2.56 0.04
implied 0.31 10.22 -0.35 47.50 23.39 0.67
(0.03) (0.97) (0.05) (4.27) (1.49) (0.03)
U.S.-Italy data 37.99 1.41 76.98 0.49 0.08
implied 0.27 13.45 -0.43 80.40 43.31 0.72
(0.04) (1.91) (0.07) (28.90) (13.76) (0.04)
U.S.-Japan data 24.65 -2.98 109.65 15.74 0.08
implied 0.42 6.92 -0.12 57.44 19.05 0.55
(0.05) (1.09) (0.10) (7.82) (2.51) (0.05)
U.S.-U.K. data 38.87 -1.25 76.52 5.36 0.08
implied 0.28 10.3 -0.38 34.49 18.31 0.69
(0.03) (1.26) (0.06) (4.31) (1.57) (0.03)
Table 4: Accounting for the Empirical PuzzlesExchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 35
Figure 1: Delayed Overshooting Response to an Unanticipated Increase in Domestic Interest Rate. k =0 .1
and λ =0 .98.
Figure 2: Delayed Overshooting and Forward Premium Puzzle Regions.Exchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 36
Figure 3: Volatility and Persistence Puzzles.Exchange Rate Puzzles and Distorted Beliefs 37
Figure 4: 3-months Eurorates and 3, 6 and 12 months forecasts, against the U.S. dollar (panel A-F) and
3-months eurodollar (panel G).